Working paper
Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion
Michel Le Breton, Alban Thomas, and Vera Zaporozhets
IDEI Working Paper
n. 732, July 18, 2012
Reference
Michel Le Breton, Alban Thomas, and Vera Zaporozhets, “Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion”, IDEI Working Paper, n. 732, July 18, 2012.
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical non-cooperative model of bargaining to analyse project funding in the French river basin com- mittees. After sorting out some of the main theoretical predictions, we proceed with an empirical application to the subsidy policy of French Wa- ter Agencies. The theoretical model of bargaining is simulated for various risk preferences, and a reduced-form estimation of the distribution of sub- sidies is performed. We find some evidence in support of the predictions regarding the role of bargaining in decision-making for water management.
JEL codes
- D10: General
- D64: Altruism • Philanthropy
- D91: Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
- E21: Consumption • Saving • Wealth